Tag Archives: David Hopkins

Fox News reveals that most Americans have liberal views on the issues. That’s not Fox’s problem.

Folks on the left had fun on Tuesday night posting images on Twitter of the results of polling by Fox News Channel. Most Americans, the survey found, are decidedly liberal on a host of issues.

Changing to a government-run health care plan: 39% strongly favor; 33% somewhat favor; 14% somewhat oppose; 15% strongly oppose.

Supreme Court action on Roe v. Wade: 71% leave as is; 29% overturn it.

U.S. gun laws should be: 55% more strict; 12% less strict; 33% kept as is.

What should happen to illegal immigrants in the U.S.? 72% pathway to citizenship; 28% deportation.

Increasing government spending on green & renewable energy: 37% strongly favor; 33% somewhat favor; 16% somewhat oppose; 15% strongly oppose.

Donald Trump’s approach to Russia: 4% too tough; 58% not tough enough; 38% about right.

And so on. What Fox (and viewers) discovered is a phenomenon that’s goes back decades. Here’s how Matthew Grossmann and David A. Hopkins described it in Asymmetric Politics:

The American electorate consistently holds collectively left-of-center views on most policy issues even as it leans to the right on more general measures of ideologyas Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril observed nearly five decades ago, the public is simultaneously operationally liberal and symbolically conservative.

Operationally liberal: when asked their opinions about political issues, majorities consistently take the liberal side (as did the folks FNC polled). In other words, when confronted with specific issues, they approve of public policies that actively address or remedy the situation (and they do so even if, in the abstract, they embrace small government or rugged individualism — symbolically conservative positions).

Symbolically conservative: when asked to characterize their ideology or philosophical outlook, more Americans say they are ‘Conservative’ than ‘Liberal’ — that’s how they view themselves. They embrace traditional American values, which the GOP has branded as its own (and runs with year after year, rather than emphasizing its unpopular policies).

Huge numbers of Republican voters and Trump supporters are operationally liberal and symbolically conservative. They vote for the party that opposes their views and interests. There’s nothing new here. It’s the starting point of Thomas Frank’s What’s the Matter with Kansas?

Unfortunately for Democrats, adopting positions on a range of issues that most Americans are in agreement with hardly guarantees support at the polls. As Grossmann and Hopkins explain: the pendulum swings back and forth (with Democrats winning one cycle, Republicans another) with an electorate that sometimes makes a decision based on specific Democratic issues (in 2018 healthcare was critical), sometimes based on abstract Republican messaging (often, as negative polarization has increased, in broad strokes that demean their opponents: socialists, radicals, elitists).

The level of negative partisanship is so high now, it is harder than ever to break through to the other side to make ones case. That’s a huge problem for the Democratic Party, which Alex Pareene addresses with a question, ‘What if it barely matters what Democrats “talk about” or “campaign on”?‘ His answer isn’t encouraging:

It seems possible … that voters no longer believe that the Democratic Party represents a coalition that includes the working class, and that even if the party puts forward Democratic candidates who support pro-worker policy, it simply will not suffice to reach or convince voters.

It’s inevitable that the FNC mix of propaganda and actual news will clash from time to time. While amusing, that’s not really a problem for the network. What Tuesday night’s polling results show, however, is something that Democrats must grapple with, if the party is ever to regain the White House while enjoying majorities in both houses of Congress. With such a closely divided nation, a constitutional structure that advantages vast stretches of land rather than people, and an opposition party bent on obstruction and paralysis, Democrats have to figure out how to gain the support of folks from red states, who would actually benefit from Democratic policies.

Making the case for the view of political scientists that Donald Trump is a weak president

Is Donald Trump a weak president? A number of political scientists and commentators have answered this question affirmatively. A strong case can be made for this view. I was in the affirmative camp in February 2019. By December 2019, I had begun to harbor doubts. In this post, I survey why Trump is regarded as a weak president. In a subsequent post, I will look at the strong grounds we have for challenging this view.

Presidential Power

Generations of political scientists have looked to Richard Neustadt’s analysis in Presidential Power, which suggests that our constitutional system, featuring separated powers, institutional constraints, and competition among political actors, limits what a president can accomplish through the sole exercise of formal powers (though these are substantial). Thus the president must elicit the cooperation of others to get things done. A president’s effectiveness is found in his power to persuade.

We might better think of ‘persuasion’ as negotiation, because Neustadt envisages “hard bargaining” and a give and take between the president and other political actors.

The essence of a President’s persuasive task, with congressmen and everybody else, is to induce them to believe that what he wants of them is what their own appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them to do in their interest, not his. Because men may differ in their views on public policy, because differences in outlook stem from differences in duty—duty to one’s office, one’s constituents, oneself—that task is bound to be more like collective bargaining than like a reasoned argument among philosopher kings.

Jonathan Bernstein, who argued before Trump’s inauguration that “We may be at the beginning of a historically weak presidency,” observes (in “The 1960 Book That Explains Why Trump Is a Failure“) that in Neustadt’s view:

“persuasion” doesn’t necessarily mean changing anyone’s mind. It may just mean convincing someone in a position of power to do nothing rather than something.

Bernstein also notes that

skilled presidents … rely on more than just threats. They work hard to build strong relationships, and know when to dangle carrots to loosely affiliated supporters, too.

A savvy and effective president makes good use of the tools at his command, which may include: a reservoir of knowledge and the know-how to command the levers of power; an understanding of the political interests and needs of, for instance, the senators and members of Congress with whom a president must deal; a reputation as someone who can articulate what he wants, whose word can be trusted, and is prepared to do what he says he will do; and a favorable standing with the American public.

Donald Trump lacks virtually every asset on the list. It is safe to say that Neustadt’s image of a strong president looked nothing like our current president. Several distinct critiques of Trump’s shortcomings illustrate why this is so. Let’s begin with Daniel Drezner’s “Immature Leadership: Donald Trump and the American Presidency.”

Trump as Toddler

Drezner notes Trump’s meager legislative accomplishments, feckless executive orders, and the absence of trade or arms control agreements, among other failures. Drezner attributes this record to specific psychological traits of the President. Drezner has observed that friend and foe alike (and even Trump himself) have depicted Trump in language applicable to “a rambunctious two-year old.”

Even a cursory examination of the Trump literature reveals a peculiarity unique to this president: almost all his biographers, even his acolytes, describe him in terms one would use for a toddler. He offers the greatest example of pervasive developmental delay in American political history.

Between April 25, 2017 – when Drezner posted a tweet noting that Trump’s staff talked about him like a toddler – and April 27, 2020 – three years later, Drezner had writen a book, The Toddler in Chief: What Donald Trump Teaches Us about the Modern Presidency, and posted 1,358 tweets citing references to Trump as toddler. “It is safe to say that Donald Trump has not grown into the presidency. At this point, the thread itself possesses more maturity than the commander in chief.”

Drezner identifies Trump’s quick temper, short attention span, and poor impulse control as primary traits that have greatly impaired Trump’s effectiveness as president. Making the case for Trump’s deficiencies, based on the review in “Immature Leadership,” is child’s play. Drezner concludes: “If Neustadt is correct in his view that the chief power of the presidency is the ability to persuade, then Donald Trump has been a weak, ineffectual president.”

Trump as Failed Deal Maker

We can make an equally strong case with a different approach. Consider a calling card of Donald Trump years before he ran for president. As the nominal author of Trump: The Art of the Deal (actually ghostwritten by a writer “who put lipstick on a pig“) and in his starring role as the chief executive on NBC’s “The Apprentice,” Trump convinced much of the country that he was a skillful deal maker. The evidence of the past 3+ years reveals the opposite. His shortcomings as a negotiator have become well known during his presidency. Seven months into his term, Calculated Risk, an economics blog, distinguished two kinds of negotiation – distributive (win-lose) and integrative (win-win) – to explain Trump’s failures as a negotiator.

Trump’s approach is win-lose. Distributive deals are zero-sum. Bluster, bluffing, empty threats, even lies might carry the day with the sale of real estate, especially if one has no intention of ever making another deal with the buyer. Take the money and don’t look back.

A successful president, on the other hand, must rely on integrative negotiating skills, which Trump lacks.

The approach to an integrative negotiation includes building trust, understanding the other party’s concerns, and knowing the details of the agreement – with the goal to reach a mutually beneficial agreement.

Trump can’t be trusted, since he is both irresolute (saying one thing one day, and another thing the next) and has a reputation as a cheat (well-earned before he ran for president). He’s certainly not working hard “to build strong relationships.” He fails to master substantive matters, including policy choices, proposed legislation, and international conflicts. This deficit – and his lack of empathy or even a modicum of curiosity – blind him to the concerns and even the incentives of whoever is on the other side of the negotiating table.

More than once Trump’s threats to Democrats made no sense because he was warning of consequences that his own party had more reason to fear than did Democrats. His misreading of Kim Jong Un has been grotesque.

Trump’s reliance on gut instinct and on fantasies regarding personal relationships (and even ‘love letters’), and his aversion to strategic planning, have yielded few agreements after 40 months in office. His inability to persuade negotiators on the other side demonstrates glaring weakness.

Trump as Narcissist

Trump’s self-love and hunger for the adoration of others, which crowd out virtually everything else in his personal space, is in evidence every day.

Trump, as Ashley Parker put it last month, clings to a “me-me-me ethos.” In the face of a rising death toll, millions of unemployment claims, and long lines at food banks, Trump made the coronavirus briefings all about himself – “his self image, his media coverage, his supplicants and his opponents, both real and imagined.”

George Conway – employing DSM criteria for narcissism – has taken time and care to document Trump’s compulsive focus on himself and his profound lack of empathy for others (“Unfit for Office”). It is critical to note that Conway (an attorney, not a psychiatrist) is focused on Trump’s publicly observable behavior and how that renders Trump incapable of fulfilling the fiduciary responsibilities of the office of president. He has no interest in rendering a medical/psychiatric diagnosis.

There is no contradiction, in fact, in both calling Trump “a world-class narcissist” and declining to label him as mentally ill. It doesn’t take a degree in medicine or psychology to see in plain sight Trump’s extraordinary vanity and callousness. Conway argues convincingly that, “Trump’s ingrained and extreme behavioral characteristics make it impossible for him to carry out the duties of the presidency in the way the Constitution requires.”

For our purposes, we can conclude that his distinctive psychological makeup robs Trump of managerial competence and the capacity to persuade.

Trump as COVID-19 Bystander

Finally, the COVID-19 debacle, and Trump’s flight from accountability, is documented daily by the news media. Last month David Hopkins cataloged Trump’s blunders in response to the pandemic (“The Weakest Modern Presidency Faces a Pandemic From the Couch”), including failing to engage meaningfully with the issue. “According to recent reporting, Trump is unengaged with the substance of his administration’s COVID mitigation efforts: his discursive appearances at task force meetings reveal a limited understanding of relevant subjects when he attends at all, and he spends much of the workday watching cable television.”

Hopkins summarizes:

All of these traits were visible before COVID came along. But now the demands on this presidency have grown stronger while the president looks less and less comfortable in the job, unable even to mimic the seriousness of purpose that other elected officials have marshaled in the moment. [Emphasis added.]

Trump as toddler, failed deal maker, narcissist, and passive bystander: all point to the same conclusion. Trump lacks basic managerial skills, an affinity for negotiation, and an informed understanding of government. His deeply rooted self-absorption renders him incapable of acting as an effective executive. He is deficient in both credibility and the power to persuade anyone not predisposed to defer to him.

On the other hand

As strong as the case is for the conclusion, ‘Trump is a weak president,’ it leaves something out: Trump’s singular, imposing dominance over the Republican Party, which is without precedent among other presidents stretching back to FDR (Neustadt’s starting point). While Trump displays many conspicuous weaknesses as president, his command over the GOP undermines the conclusion.

Mark Shields alluded to this dominance in December, noting (in my words, not his) that LBJ was a weakling compared to Trump regarding the fear that each man generated among the party faithful. The fearsome LBJ could only dream of dominating the Democratic Party as Trump dominates the GOP.

I will argue in a subsequent post that Trump’s domination of the GOP is not an empty illusion (contrary to advocates of the view that Trump is a weak president); that as ham-handed, uninformed, and constrained by compulsive self-absorption as Trump is, he has become more powerful over the past three years; and that these (and other) considerations undercut the conclusion.  

(Image: small man creates a commotion, flailing and whining about how unfairly others treat him, and grasps for a simplistic solution.)

Political scientists explain why Republicans overlook the truth and the facts

Political scientists Matt Grossmann and David A. Hopkins have written a book, Asymmetric Politics, that offers a framework for understanding American politics – and in particular to explain consistent differences in the behavior of Democrats and Republicans. Beginning with a key insight – party asymmetry – that has been noted in the past (prominently by Jo Freeman, “The Political Culture of the Democratic and Republican Parties,” 1986), but often ignored in subsequent inquiry and analysis, their book provides a window into contemporary politics in the United States.

Party asymmetry is at the root of much that is distinctive about American politics and government. We synthesize a wide variety of research in order to document the most consequential differences between Democrats and Republicans and emphasize their widespread implications…. Recognizing the distinct styles of each party can produce better explanations for political events and trends, including contemporary polarization and dysfunction.

Their analysis is spot on and, if I’m right, it reaches beyond the differentiating patterns they discuss in their book.

One difference between Republicans and Democrats – and this is my observation (though hardly original) and not Grossmann and Hopkins’ – is found in the relationship each side has to truth, facts, and evidence. Here’s one way to put it (my first take): Republicans rely on lies, half-truths, and a variety of tactics – such as throwing up chaff, muddying the waters, attacking the messenger, and spreading false narratives – to obscure, hide, and distract from inconvenient facts and credible standards of evidence. This behavior represents a consistent difference between Republicans and Democrats (whose political success requires, for instance, a more rigorous embrace of facts, both general and specific).

In reading the book, I realized early on that Asymmetric Politics offered a persuasive explanation for this difference in the behavior of the two parties – a difference that is clearly observable and (even with the he-said-she-said, both-sides-are-squabbling journalistic style of the mainstream media) increasingly hard to ignore. (The impeachment spectacle – with Republican defenses of Trump that point in every direction except the President’s, will not acknowledge any facts not embraced by Fox News Channel or @realDonaldTrump, and finally rely on “flat-out falsehoods,” as Jonathan Bernstein observed – is a case in point.) While Asymmetric Politics never addresses this specific difference, the framework that Grossmann and Hopkins establish explains why we find this divergence vis-à-vis truth, facts, and evidence in the behavior of the two parties.

In this post, I will set out the first step of an explanation that follows from the framework developed in Asymmetric Politics. It is only the first step, so it doesn’t take us as far as I believe the complete explanation does. But the first step is significant.

To simplify and advance my argument, I will set aside the description in the italicized sentence above and adopt the language of a former Republican Member of Congress. Republicans are (in the words of David Jolly) “willing to engage in overlooking the truth, overlooking facts.” Democrats, not so much.

Let’s begin with Jolly’s characterization of Republican behavior. Note that the discussion in Part I does not draw on the account in Asymmetric Politics. Note also: how Republican messaging has come to rely on outright falsehoods (rather than simply overlooking truth and facts) appears at a subsequent step in the explanation. For this post, and step one, we will stick with Jolly’s way of putting things.

I. Republicans engage in overlooking the truth and overlooking facts

David Jolly, commenting on the Republican response to the testimony of Fiona Hill before the House Intelligence Committee (on MSNBC during a break in Fiona Hill and David Holmes’ testimony), had this to say:

What Fiona Hill said to us and the nation is, ‘We’re in trouble.’ It reflected very much what we heard from Bob Mueller’s closing statement. It reflected what he heard from an impassioned Elijah Cummings: That we are a nation whose divisions have been exploited by a foreign state. And the reason that context is important is, first, what are we going to do about it? And, secondly, it paints the Republican line of questioning as not just maddening but sickening in many ways. Heartbreaking. That, in fact, perhaps Russia has achieved what it was striking out to achieve. That we have one of the two major parties who’s willing to engage in overlooking the truth, overlooking facts.

These comments (which are hardly controversial among informed observers not sheltered within the conservative media bubble) highlight the phenomenon I wish to discuss. Jolly doesn’t use the word, ‘lie’ (or ‘falsehood’ or another synonym). His words are less harsh, more compatible with traditional norms of civil discourse, and nearer to the traditional language of the mainstream media, than my italicized statement.

Jolly frames the phenomenon as overlooking the truth and facts. And his way of putting it – “willing to engage in overlooking” – suggests that this phenomenon is not characterized by carelessness, or inattention, or neglect; it is, instead, an active accomplishment performed freely. It is, in my view (taking Jolly off the hook regarding my argument), something that Republicans have set out to do – purposely, with malice aforethought. Overlooking the truth and facts is an act of artifice or evasion.

(Since I’ve invoked Jolly, I’ll acknowledge in passing a December 6 Vox interview regarding Republicans’ efforts to defend Trump. When Sean Illing asks, “You know these people. I assume you still talk to them. What are they thinking?” Jolly responds:

I can’t tell you how many Republican members of Congress have told me, “I’m just trying to keep my head down and not get noticed.” They see all the excitement stirred up by people like Jim Jordan and Devin Nunes but at least half the caucus wants to stay the hell out of the media. They’re not looking to make a name through this, they’re looking to survive this.

I struggle with whether some of their behaviors are an intentional decision on their part to engage in either misdirection, or to overlook the facts because they have a fealty to the president or because they want to put a stake in the ground in right-wing media or because it just works in their districts. Or are some of them just duped into it by following the leader?)

For the purposes of this post, we need not wrestle with motivation or states of mind. Instead, I will confine myself to an observation for which there is ample evidence: Republicans engage in overlooking the truth and the facts, in contrast to Democrats.

To see how Asymmetric Politics explains this difference, let’s turn to the authors’ analysis:

II. Why do Democrats and Republicans act so differently?

The answer offered by Professors Grossman and Hopkins begins with a look at the foundational differences between the two parties. The Democratic Party is a coalition of diverse social groups. The Republican Party is the vehicle of an ideological movement.

Asymmetric Politics describes and documents this fundamental asymmetry. Many groups, with diverse interests, mobilize under the big tent of the Democratic Party: women (especially single and professional women and millennials), African Americans, urbanites, union households, environmentalists, ethnic and religious minorities, immigrants, the LGBTQ community, …. These groups (and others) may embrace different agendas (and may spurn liberalism), but they each look to the Democrats for policies that advance their interests.  The Republican Party, in contrast, is more homogenous, attracting true believers to an ideological crusade marked by devotion to a revered ideology. Adherents self-identify as conservative and, by the beginning of the 21st century, liberal and moderate Republicans had largely been purged from the GOP. (Even most of the prominent never-Trumpers in the party are conservative.)

Thus, the parties are not mirror images of one another or two sides of the same coin. They are different in kind. The disparate foundations of each party result in a cascade of consequences that play out in the political arena.

The Democratic Party’s character as a social group coalition fosters a relatively pragmatic, results-oriented style of politics in which officeholders are rewarded for delivering concrete benefits to targeted groups in order to address specific social problems. Republicans, in contrast, are more likely to forge partisan ties based on common ideological beliefs, encouraging party officials to pursue broad rightward shifts in public policy. As a result, Republican voters and activists are more likely than their Democratic counterparts to prize symbolic demonstrations of ideological purity and to pressure their party leaders to reject moderation and compromise.

The foundational asymmetry of the two parties produces distinct differences in the approaches of Democrats and Republicans, respectively, to public policy debates, campaigning, voting, and governing. Republicans – leaders and followers – behave differently than Democratic leaders and followers.

From a simple, elegant beginning – the asymmetric roots of each party – Grossmann and Hopkins develop an explanation of the partisan skirmishes we witness in national politics. Another step in their analysis hinges on the distinctive ways the parties campaign in response to “a collective inconsistency” among American voters.

III. Americans are symbolic conservatives and operational liberals

Democrats and Republicans characteristically regard political choices differently.

In surveys dating back to 1981, when Americans respond to surveys regarding specific issues, a majority – often even a majority of Republicans – favor liberal social policies (which represent the Democratic agenda). Social Security and Medicare, environmental and consumer protections, funding for education, transportation, and even welfare have ample popular support. A majority of Americans are, in the language of political scientists, “operational liberals.”

But don’t tell that to American voters. They may (whether they’ve reflected on it or not) like liberal programs, but when asked to describe their political views, more Americans identify as conservatives, than as liberals. (Gallup, in January 2019, put the number of liberals at 26%, while 35% of Americans regarded themselves as conservative.) Further, when waxing philosophical, Americans lean right, expressing a preference for a smaller, less powerful government that provides less “free stuff” (in Mitt Romney’s words, reflecting the Republican point of view). In the idiom of social science, this conservative predisposition makes Americans “symbolic conservatives.”

Recognizing this disparity, the parties play to their strengths in political campaigns and policy debates.

Candidates battling for the nomination of either party face an obvious strategic incentive to adopt the most effective means of stimulating popular appeal among their fellow partisans, which might be expected to carry over into elevated enthusiasm within the loyal party base once a successful nominee turns to face the opposition in the fall campaign. But the tendency of Democrats to emphasize policy specifics and group benefits and the corresponding Republican penchant for stressing more abstract ideological themes are both further reinforced by the broader American public’s simultaneous preference for operational liberalism and symbolic conservatism.  Democratic and Republican candidates compete for the support of persuadable voters in general elections by battling to establish their preferred frame of partisan conflict: Democrats gain an advantage by portraying the differences between the candidates as primarily defined by distinct policy positions, while Republicans benefit when voters instead view their electoral options as representing a choice between contrasting philosophical commitments.

IV. Overlooking the truth and the facts is deeply embedded in the Republican Party

The foundational differences between the parties (as described in Part II) and the differences in the way the two parties communicate their messages (as described in Part III) provides an explanation for why Republicans engage in overlooking the truth and overlooking facts, in contrast to the approach of Democrats. To see why this is so, let’s explore the implications of these contrasts – beginning with the Democrats.

Democrats in office, responsive to members of their coalition, “are rewarded for delivering concrete benefits to targeted groups in order to address specific social problems.” Democrats are intent on doing something tangible – crafting, enacting, and implementing public policies – to benefit their constituents. Practical results matter.

A moment’s reflection shows why this pragmatic imperative precludes Democratic indifference to, or dodging of, facts and evidence. Crafting legislation and rulemaking, for instance, are unlikely to turn out well unless Democrats have their facts straight. Without a solid understanding of the social problem, disadvantage, or injustice they seek to remedy or mitigate, Democrats would be hard pressed to know how to proceed. Research, policy expertise, and real-world feedback are essential to creating programs that benefit constituents.

Results-oriented Democrats have a stake in making things work – even if they must compromise or proceed incrementally to move nearer to the goal. Half a loaf is better than none. Democrats aim to offer help through public policy initiatives. This enterprise is thoroughly fact-based because that maximizes the prospects of success. And failure is unlikely to yield votes.

Republicans, on the other hand, risk defeat if they are perceived as straying from what counts as conservative doctrine. “Republican voters and activists are more likely than their Democratic counterparts to prize symbolic demonstrations of ideological purity and to pressure their party leaders to reject moderation and compromise.”

Standing up for conservative values is paramount. Moreover, conservative ideology affirms both a belief in limited government and skepticism, even hostility, toward fixing social problems through government initiatives. Add to this an aversion to helping the “takers” (Mitt Romney, again Paul Ryan) in the Democratic coalition.

When ideology is front and center, facts are beside the point. Republicans aren’t interested in facts about disadvantaged groups, or communities experiencing injustice, or public policy options to address social problems. Doing nothing – without taking facts into account – is the default position of conservative ideology.

Loyalty to conservatism demands resistance to government intervention. Any compromise – tacking this way or that way to get something done – is a failure to uphold principle. Half a loaf is half a loaf too much. Obstruction counts as success. The adage, ‘Don’t confuse me with the facts,’ is completely apropos here.

V. Democratic ACA and Republican Repeal and Replace

Consider, by way of illustrating the parties’ distinct stances regarding truth and facts, a major piece of Democratic legislation, the Affordable Care Act, and the Republican pledge to repeal and replace it.

When Barack Obama directed Congress to reform health care, after pledging to do so during his campaign, he knew there were Democrats in the House and the Senate who had spent decades studying the issue and who therefore: understood the real-world problems that accompany the way health care is delivered in the U.S.; were familiar with a range of proposed solutions, the costs and trade-offs, and the industry interests that would have to be accommodated; and had learned from Bill Clinton’s failed effort at reform early in his administration.

Health care policy is complicated, expensive, and affects everyone. Democrats were well-prepared to take up the challenge, beginning with a clear sense of the policy goals: to increase the number of Americans with health insurance, to make health care more affordable, and to enact consumer protections.

A Democratic Congress drew on academic research; the experience of doctors, hospitals, drug makers, insurers, and consumers, among others; policy expertise inside and outside of government; and lobbyists representing every sector with a stake in the issue. Congress held scores of hearings as it crafted the Affordable Healthcare Act and revised the law both to satisfy the policy goals and to secure majorities in both the House and the Senate for a bill that the President could sign.

ACA was signed into law in March 2010. It has for the most part worked as intended (even as both the Trump administration and many Republican-led states have done their best to sabotage it – efforts that are ongoing). The great majority of people with insurance from the exchanges are pleased with the law, as are others who have received tangible benefits as a result of the changes.

Passing and implementing the ACA would have been utterly impossible without an exacting command of the facts – and an unwillingness to permit wishful thinking, or ideological fervor, or irresistible campaign talking points to trump the empirically grounded details that guided the effort.

Compare that success to the Republican failure to undo the ACA, aka, Obamacare. Republicans campaigned in 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016 on the promise to repeal and replace Obamacare (with something better and cheaper), but after winning the White House and both houses of Congress in 2016, they proved incapable of doing so.

Why? Republicans don’t have a very deep public policy bench in Congress. GOP Congressional leaders have shown little interest in health care apart from opposition to Obamacare. The GOP didn’t conduct scores of hearings to clarify their understanding of the problems with the delivery of health care, or to assess and refine proposed solutions. Furthermore, previous GOP ideas – such as Heritage Foundation plans as early as 1989 – are no longer viable because the Republican Party has moved so far to right in the intervening years. That Heritage plan, like Mitt Romney’s reform in Massachusetts, is far too socialistic for the party now (though perhaps it was then, as well; it may have been a stalking horse).

The ideal health care policy of conservative true believers is probably the 1950s-era status quo in the United States (before the passage of Medicare). Although moderates and liberals have been purged from the party, that anachronistic vision is too draconian for many Republicans (or at least for their constituents). Tens of millions of people are insured because of Obamacare – in red states and blue. Subsidies are available. Pre-existing conditions are covered. Parents can insure their children up to age 26.

Campaigning against the individual mandate might have won votes, but coverage for preexisting conditions wouldn’t be possible without requiring everyone to have insurance. Republican voters get riled up over “socialism,” but most don’t want to see their representatives disrupt the post-Obamacare state of affairs. That might be a contradiction, but, as we know, many Republicans are operational liberals (and have benefited from the law).

So, here’s the box the GOP found itself in after November 2016: repealing unpopular provisions and regulations of ACA would eliminate the popular features. Millions of Americans appreciate the coverage the law provides; no one wants to lose benefits or to see deductibles and premiums rise. Republicans found themselves in a familiar place: opposed to government ‘overreach,’ but unable to eliminate a major social welfare program.

In the GOP, as described in Asymmetric Politics, general themes expressing traditional values (and attacks on liberalism and socialism) trump specific, concrete facts. We saw that in the case of repeatedly invoked pledges to repeal and replace. There was never, over seven years’ time, a viable plan to replace Obamacare with. There was no way to keep the popular provisions of the law, while throwing out what conservatives detested. There was hardly a plausible political route to repeal and replace. Yet Republicans repeatedly campaigned on that promise. What can we say about them? At the least: Republicans engaged in overlooking the truth and the facts when repeatedly invoking that pledge.

This is a well-worn pattern baked into the foundational fabric of the Republican Party. Facts don’t matter much when officeholders are guided by ideology (and raw partisan calculation).

V. Subsequent steps in the explanation

The next steps in the explanation of the distinctive Republican aversion to truth, facts, and trustworthy evidentiary standards begin with a look at the conservative media universe, which Grossmann and Hopkins analyze and document in Chapter 4 (“The Not-So-Great Debate”) of their book. As we approach 2020, as many observers have noted, Fox News has become a dominating force in the Republican Party; FNC not only informs (and misinforms), it motivates activists, increases Republican turnout, and punishes officeholders in the GOP; and, as Fox has gained strength, distortion and distraction have morphed into conspiracy theories and falsehoods in Republican messaging.

All topics to explore in future posts.

(Image: screen grab of video by Meg Kelly, “President Trump has made 15,413 false or misleading claims over 1,055 days,” December 16, 2019, Washington Post.)

Women are leading the Resistance to Trump and focused on generating a Blue Wave in November

In a previous post I suggested that the greatest threat to a Blue Wave this fall was sky high Republican turnout on behalf of a president with historically low approval ratings. Trump’s campaign strategy is to gin up his base by stoking division, including (as Paul Ryan has observed) straight-up trolling his perceived enemies. Thus far, his base is sticking with him as measured by his “own party” approval ratings. He is also able to sway a huge swath of Republican primary voters.

But of course the Trump onslaught can’t help but rile up his opponents as well. What reasons do we have for believing that a Blue Wave will crest on Election Day?

First, a brief aside to consider several views of what a ‘wave election’ is. Nate Cohn tweets:

Amy Walter at the Cook Political Report, looking at the elections Cohn references – 1994, 2006, and 2010, provides a bar graph illustrating the number of seats needed by the out-party in each case plus the number of additional seats they actually won:

(Click for link at Cook Political Report and scroll down to view larger image.)

“By this metric,” she writes, “a gain of 35 seats by the Democrats should be considered a wave.”

Alexi McCammond at Axios points to a report by Ballotpedia, which begins with this definition: “We define wave elections as the 20 percent of elections where the president’s party lost the most seats during the last 100 years (50 election cycles).” Based on this criterion, Democrats would need to win 48 House seats for it to constitute a wave.

The bottom line, of course, isn’t whether the Democratic margin of victory hits a designated historical benchmark – though the political impact will be amplified as the margin of victory increases – it’s whether or not the Democrats win working majority in the House. At this stage, we don’t know, but if it happens, what will drive that victory?

“Reports from journalists and academics describe grassroots organizational activity by left-of-center citizens and groups that is unequalled since Barack Obama’s first presidential campaign, and disproportionate political engagement among women that may have been last matched during the push for the Equal Rights Amendment four decades ago,” writes David Hopkins at Honest Graft, who believes this is the underreported story of 2018, receiving only “a small fraction of the media coverage that was directed to the Tea Party movement in advance of the Republican victories of 2010.”

Hopkins argues that because the media loves conflict and – unlike the Tea Party, which aggressively challenged the Republican establishment – the grassroots movement opposing Trump hasn’t fractured the Democratic Party, created anti-Washington fervor, or given rise to ideological purity.

“We are left, instead, with a picture of millions of Americans arrayed from the political left to the center, disproportionately well-educated, suburban, and professional, who are simultaneously captivated and repulsed by the day-to-day behavior of Donald Trump.”

Theda Skocpal, a scholar who studied the Tea Party and has looked more recently at the opposition to Trump, notes that while activists from both groups sound surprisingly similar (“I used to vote. Now I realize my country could be lost, and I have to do more.”), the resistance to Trump is a center-left phenomenon led overwhelmingly by women. Skopal estimates that 70% of Indivisible participants, for instance, and most of its leaders, are women.

These are middle-class women’s networks, with some men in them. They turned around public opinion on the Affordable Care Act. They were behind Conor Lamb’s victory, along with the unions. They’re everywhere, and they have made a real difference. They’re likely to be the key to congressional victories, if they happen.”

Tea Party activists were clustered on the ideological far right and infused with anti-establishment fervor. The Resistance looks different. She notes that it is not being driven by Bernie Sanders’ followers, nor the left-most stalwarts in the Democratic Party. Instead, they are as likely to occupy the middle of the road as the far left.

“They’re not likely to be highly ideological. They care about good government, health care, education, decency toward immigrants and refugees. A lot of them got involved through church networks…..

A lot of them are progressive, but they’re also pragmatic. They don’t insist on the leftmost candidate. They’ll get behind any reasonable Democrat.”

Will the anti-Trump movement push Democrats to the House majority in 2018? There are powerful obstacles to overcome. The most prominent, as George Packer puts it: “Democrats have a habit of forgetting to vote between Presidential elections.” And the demographic groups that boast the highest level of support for Democrats – such as young people, black and Latino communities, and working class folks – are the most likely to forget.

At this stage, though, the wind is at the Democrats’ backs. A study released at the beginning of this week, revealed a surge of Democratic enthusiasm, as measured by turnout in 2018 primary elections: up 84% compared with 2014. In comparison, Republican turnout is up only 14% relative to 2014.

But the bottom line is that votes cast, not increased turnout, will carry the day on November 6. And in many of the House districts that Democrats need to flip, Republicans outnumber Democrats. Plus, Republicans are simply more reliable voters.

Consider: among the most talked about House seats that Democrats are targeting nationally are a number of California districts, seven of which have been on the Democrats’ Red to Blue wish list for more than a year. They are: CD 10 (Jeff Denham); CD 21 (David Valadao); CD 25 (Steve Knight); CD 39 (Ed Royce – retiring); CD 45 (Mimi Walters); CD 48 (Dana Rohrabacher); and CD 49 (Darrell Issa – Retiring).

In six out of these seven districts, Republicans on the June 2018 primary ballot received more votes than Democratic candidates did. The only exception was CD 49, where 92,837 votes were cast for Democrats and 89,839 votes for Republicans. Representative Issa, alone among the Republican Congressmen from these seven districts, narrowly avoided defeat in 2016. The Cook Political Report rated (as of August 9) CD 49 as ‘Lean Democratic,’ though there is a slight Republican registration edge, with a Cook Partisan Voter Index (PVI) rating of ‘R+1.’

But, while Republicans turnout more reliably, more Democrats get out to vote for general elections than for primaries. With a ballot for California’s Governor and the U.S. Senate in November, Democratic turnout will dwarf what we saw in June. So Democrats can expect to be highly competitive, if not quite favored. Cook rated four of these races ‘Republican Toss Up’: CDs 10, 25, and 39, which all have a PVI rating of ‘Even,’ along with CD 48, which has a PVI of ‘R+4.’ Cook rated CD 45 as ‘Lean Republican’ (PVI: ‘R+3’) and CA 21 as ‘Likely Republican’ (PVI: ‘D+5’).

If Democrats flip the House in November, credit a diverse group of activists throughout the country, but count on middle-class women to drive the change. As Theda Skocpol describes the movement to resist Trump, “This will not look like a far-left reinvention of Tea Partiers or a continuation of Bernie 2016. It will look like retired librarians rolling their eyes at the present state of affairs, and then taking charge.”

Photograph: editor’s photo of January 20, 2018 Women’s March in Los Angeles.