Tag Archives: Matt Grossmann

Fox News reveals that most Americans have liberal views on the issues. That’s not Fox’s problem.

Folks on the left had fun on Tuesday night posting images on Twitter of the results of polling by Fox News Channel. Most Americans, the survey found, are decidedly liberal on a host of issues.

Changing to a government-run health care plan: 39% strongly favor; 33% somewhat favor; 14% somewhat oppose; 15% strongly oppose.

Supreme Court action on Roe v. Wade: 71% leave as is; 29% overturn it.

U.S. gun laws should be: 55% more strict; 12% less strict; 33% kept as is.

What should happen to illegal immigrants in the U.S.? 72% pathway to citizenship; 28% deportation.

Increasing government spending on green & renewable energy: 37% strongly favor; 33% somewhat favor; 16% somewhat oppose; 15% strongly oppose.

Donald Trump’s approach to Russia: 4% too tough; 58% not tough enough; 38% about right.

And so on. What Fox (and viewers) discovered is a phenomenon that’s goes back decades. Here’s how Matthew Grossmann and David A. Hopkins described it in Asymmetric Politics:

The American electorate consistently holds collectively left-of-center views on most policy issues even as it leans to the right on more general measures of ideologyas Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril observed nearly five decades ago, the public is simultaneously operationally liberal and symbolically conservative.

Operationally liberal: when asked their opinions about political issues, majorities consistently take the liberal side (as did the folks FNC polled). In other words, when confronted with specific issues, they approve of public policies that actively address or remedy the situation (and they do so even if, in the abstract, they embrace small government or rugged individualism — symbolically conservative positions).

Symbolically conservative: when asked to characterize their ideology or philosophical outlook, more Americans say they are ‘Conservative’ than ‘Liberal’ — that’s how they view themselves. They embrace traditional American values, which the GOP has branded as its own (and runs with year after year, rather than emphasizing its unpopular policies).

Huge numbers of Republican voters and Trump supporters are operationally liberal and symbolically conservative. They vote for the party that opposes their views and interests. There’s nothing new here. It’s the starting point of Thomas Frank’s What’s the Matter with Kansas?

Unfortunately for Democrats, adopting positions on a range of issues that most Americans are in agreement with hardly guarantees support at the polls. As Grossmann and Hopkins explain: the pendulum swings back and forth (with Democrats winning one cycle, Republicans another) with an electorate that sometimes makes a decision based on specific Democratic issues (in 2018 healthcare was critical), sometimes based on abstract Republican messaging (often, as negative polarization has increased, in broad strokes that demean their opponents: socialists, radicals, elitists).

The level of negative partisanship is so high now, it is harder than ever to break through to the other side to make ones case. That’s a huge problem for the Democratic Party, which Alex Pareene addresses with a question, ‘What if it barely matters what Democrats “talk about” or “campaign on”?‘ His answer isn’t encouraging:

It seems possible … that voters no longer believe that the Democratic Party represents a coalition that includes the working class, and that even if the party puts forward Democratic candidates who support pro-worker policy, it simply will not suffice to reach or convince voters.

It’s inevitable that the FNC mix of propaganda and actual news will clash from time to time. While amusing, that’s not really a problem for the network. What Tuesday night’s polling results show, however, is something that Democrats must grapple with, if the party is ever to regain the White House while enjoying majorities in both houses of Congress. With such a closely divided nation, a constitutional structure that advantages vast stretches of land rather than people, and an opposition party bent on obstruction and paralysis, Democrats have to figure out how to gain the support of folks from red states, who would actually benefit from Democratic policies.

The voting stops tomorrow. the counting begins. The litigation continues. And then — ?

FDR template

… I think this is a critically important election, because just think if Franklin Roosevelt had not been reelected in 1936, the whole definition of the presidency, the leader as this optimistic, rallying figure, inspiring figure, would never have come really to being into American life.

Roosevelt became the standard.

If Donald Trump is reelected in 2020, it will redefine the presidency and what Americans expect of the president and of each other. I don’t think he will be. I think Joe Biden will be elected next Tuesday, and for a whole host of reasons, that America, and especially at a time of this coronavirus, are — we are looking for a we president, and Donald Trump has been a me president.

He’s been quite incapable of addressing that, stepping up to it. He’s been on the river denial as far as the crisis itself is concerned, telling us, sort of in Pollyannish tones, that it’s going to be better, or it’s already better. We just don’t see that it’s better.

And I really think that Americans are looking for a different kind of leadership, decidedly different leadership. And I think Joe Biden represents that to them, and to a majority of them. — Mark Shields, NewsHour, October 30, 2020

Carnival presidency

“If you vote for Biden, it means no kids in school, no graduations, no weddings, no Thanksgiving, no Christmas and no Fourth of July together,” Trump said Wednesday in Goodyear, Ariz. “Other than that, you have a wonderful life.”

The Trump supporters in these crowds don’t care about the gaping holes in his arguments. They don’t mind his coarse behavior. They revel as he toggles between full-throated rage and offhanded sarcasm, exhorting and chuckling, taking selfies and videos, the consummate performer.

Trump’s glib flattery — his campaign sets up big video monitors only at important rallies, he fibs at every stop — is as authentic as professional wrestling. But crowds roar with approval at his jibes and insults, ready to deliver their lines on cue: “Four more years!” “Lock her up!” “CNN sucks!”

. . .

Trump’s final, frantic surge of rallies underscore how little the former reality TV star has changed in the White House. These carnivals of passion sustain him emotionally, but may not be enough to sustain his presidency. The narcissism could be self-defeating.

After five years of following Trump, I can hear the frustration in his words, thinly veiled by his anger and professions of confidence, the fear that he may soon become what he hates most of all — a loser.Eli Stokols, Los Angeles Times, November 1, 2020

Not normal

… I have to agree with Larry Sabato: “Never in my 60 years around politics have I encountered this many people so tense, so full of dread and foreboding about an election — and what comes afterward. Of course, we’ve never before had a president undermining confidence and predicting fraud & mayhem — if he doesn’t win.”

That was before President Donald Trump applauded a group of supporters who attacked one of Joe Biden’s campaign buses; before it was reported that Trump plans to claim victory well before the votes are counted; before Trump’s staffers went on the Sunday shows and talked about their plans to stop states from counting legitimate ballots after Election Day; before the president talked about unleashing a blizzard of lawsuits as soon as the polls close; before he started fantasizing in public about assaulting Biden; and before Trump supporters shut down highways as part of … a protest? A threat? It wasn’t quite clear.

In other words: Before Sunday. — Jonathan Bernstein, Bloomberg Opinion, November 2, 2020

Likeable candidate

From the start of the Democratic primary, many Democratic voters prioritized electability, with plenty believing that Joe Biden was the most electable Democratic candidate in a general election against President Trump. Not everyone bought that argument …

. . .

But it is increasingly looking like Democractic primary voters might have been right about Biden’s electability argument. In the face of relentless attacks from the Trump campaign, Biden hasn’t dipped in the polls; in fact, he’s actually become better liked, and has built a formidable favorability advantage over Trump.

. . .

Sometimes the conventional wisdom, even among voters, is right. — Matt Grossman, Five Thirty Eight, October 30, 2020

Too close to call

Five Thirty Eight, November 2, 2020 — 4:30 p.m. PT — https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2020-election-forecast/senate/

(Image: Donald Trump accepting the GOP nomination on the South Lawn of the White House via CNBC.)

Political scientists explain why Republicans overlook the truth and the facts

Political scientists Matt Grossmann and David A. Hopkins have written a book, Asymmetric Politics, that offers a framework for understanding American politics – and in particular to explain consistent differences in the behavior of Democrats and Republicans. Beginning with a key insight – party asymmetry – that has been noted in the past (prominently by Jo Freeman, “The Political Culture of the Democratic and Republican Parties,” 1986), but often ignored in subsequent inquiry and analysis, their book provides a window into contemporary politics in the United States.

Party asymmetry is at the root of much that is distinctive about American politics and government. We synthesize a wide variety of research in order to document the most consequential differences between Democrats and Republicans and emphasize their widespread implications…. Recognizing the distinct styles of each party can produce better explanations for political events and trends, including contemporary polarization and dysfunction.

Their analysis is spot on and, if I’m right, it reaches beyond the differentiating patterns they discuss in their book.

One difference between Republicans and Democrats – and this is my observation (though hardly original) and not Grossmann and Hopkins’ – is found in the relationship each side has to truth, facts, and evidence. Here’s one way to put it (my first take): Republicans rely on lies, half-truths, and a variety of tactics – such as throwing up chaff, muddying the waters, attacking the messenger, and spreading false narratives – to obscure, hide, and distract from inconvenient facts and credible standards of evidence. This behavior represents a consistent difference between Republicans and Democrats (whose political success requires, for instance, a more rigorous embrace of facts, both general and specific).

In reading the book, I realized early on that Asymmetric Politics offered a persuasive explanation for this difference in the behavior of the two parties – a difference that is clearly observable and (even with the he-said-she-said, both-sides-are-squabbling journalistic style of the mainstream media) increasingly hard to ignore. (The impeachment spectacle – with Republican defenses of Trump that point in every direction except the President’s, will not acknowledge any facts not embraced by Fox News Channel or @realDonaldTrump, and finally rely on “flat-out falsehoods,” as Jonathan Bernstein observed – is a case in point.) While Asymmetric Politics never addresses this specific difference, the framework that Grossmann and Hopkins establish explains why we find this divergence vis-à-vis truth, facts, and evidence in the behavior of the two parties.

In this post, I will set out the first step of an explanation that follows from the framework developed in Asymmetric Politics. It is only the first step, so it doesn’t take us as far as I believe the complete explanation does. But the first step is significant.

To simplify and advance my argument, I will set aside the description in the italicized sentence above and adopt the language of a former Republican Member of Congress. Republicans are (in the words of David Jolly) “willing to engage in overlooking the truth, overlooking facts.” Democrats, not so much.

Let’s begin with Jolly’s characterization of Republican behavior. Note that the discussion in Part I does not draw on the account in Asymmetric Politics. Note also: how Republican messaging has come to rely on outright falsehoods (rather than simply overlooking truth and facts) appears at a subsequent step in the explanation. For this post, and step one, we will stick with Jolly’s way of putting things.

I. Republicans engage in overlooking the truth and overlooking facts

David Jolly, commenting on the Republican response to the testimony of Fiona Hill before the House Intelligence Committee (on MSNBC during a break in Fiona Hill and David Holmes’ testimony), had this to say:

What Fiona Hill said to us and the nation is, ‘We’re in trouble.’ It reflected very much what we heard from Bob Mueller’s closing statement. It reflected what he heard from an impassioned Elijah Cummings: That we are a nation whose divisions have been exploited by a foreign state. And the reason that context is important is, first, what are we going to do about it? And, secondly, it paints the Republican line of questioning as not just maddening but sickening in many ways. Heartbreaking. That, in fact, perhaps Russia has achieved what it was striking out to achieve. That we have one of the two major parties who’s willing to engage in overlooking the truth, overlooking facts.

These comments (which are hardly controversial among informed observers not sheltered within the conservative media bubble) highlight the phenomenon I wish to discuss. Jolly doesn’t use the word, ‘lie’ (or ‘falsehood’ or another synonym). His words are less harsh, more compatible with traditional norms of civil discourse, and nearer to the traditional language of the mainstream media, than my italicized statement.

Jolly frames the phenomenon as overlooking the truth and facts. And his way of putting it – “willing to engage in overlooking” – suggests that this phenomenon is not characterized by carelessness, or inattention, or neglect; it is, instead, an active accomplishment performed freely. It is, in my view (taking Jolly off the hook regarding my argument), something that Republicans have set out to do – purposely, with malice aforethought. Overlooking the truth and facts is an act of artifice or evasion.

(Since I’ve invoked Jolly, I’ll acknowledge in passing a December 6 Vox interview regarding Republicans’ efforts to defend Trump. When Sean Illing asks, “You know these people. I assume you still talk to them. What are they thinking?” Jolly responds:

I can’t tell you how many Republican members of Congress have told me, “I’m just trying to keep my head down and not get noticed.” They see all the excitement stirred up by people like Jim Jordan and Devin Nunes but at least half the caucus wants to stay the hell out of the media. They’re not looking to make a name through this, they’re looking to survive this.

I struggle with whether some of their behaviors are an intentional decision on their part to engage in either misdirection, or to overlook the facts because they have a fealty to the president or because they want to put a stake in the ground in right-wing media or because it just works in their districts. Or are some of them just duped into it by following the leader?)

For the purposes of this post, we need not wrestle with motivation or states of mind. Instead, I will confine myself to an observation for which there is ample evidence: Republicans engage in overlooking the truth and the facts, in contrast to Democrats.

To see how Asymmetric Politics explains this difference, let’s turn to the authors’ analysis:

II. Why do Democrats and Republicans act so differently?

The answer offered by Professors Grossman and Hopkins begins with a look at the foundational differences between the two parties. The Democratic Party is a coalition of diverse social groups. The Republican Party is the vehicle of an ideological movement.

Asymmetric Politics describes and documents this fundamental asymmetry. Many groups, with diverse interests, mobilize under the big tent of the Democratic Party: women (especially single and professional women and millennials), African Americans, urbanites, union households, environmentalists, ethnic and religious minorities, immigrants, the LGBTQ community, …. These groups (and others) may embrace different agendas (and may spurn liberalism), but they each look to the Democrats for policies that advance their interests.  The Republican Party, in contrast, is more homogenous, attracting true believers to an ideological crusade marked by devotion to a revered ideology. Adherents self-identify as conservative and, by the beginning of the 21st century, liberal and moderate Republicans had largely been purged from the GOP. (Even most of the prominent never-Trumpers in the party are conservative.)

Thus, the parties are not mirror images of one another or two sides of the same coin. They are different in kind. The disparate foundations of each party result in a cascade of consequences that play out in the political arena.

The Democratic Party’s character as a social group coalition fosters a relatively pragmatic, results-oriented style of politics in which officeholders are rewarded for delivering concrete benefits to targeted groups in order to address specific social problems. Republicans, in contrast, are more likely to forge partisan ties based on common ideological beliefs, encouraging party officials to pursue broad rightward shifts in public policy. As a result, Republican voters and activists are more likely than their Democratic counterparts to prize symbolic demonstrations of ideological purity and to pressure their party leaders to reject moderation and compromise.

The foundational asymmetry of the two parties produces distinct differences in the approaches of Democrats and Republicans, respectively, to public policy debates, campaigning, voting, and governing. Republicans – leaders and followers – behave differently than Democratic leaders and followers.

From a simple, elegant beginning – the asymmetric roots of each party – Grossmann and Hopkins develop an explanation of the partisan skirmishes we witness in national politics. Another step in their analysis hinges on the distinctive ways the parties campaign in response to “a collective inconsistency” among American voters.

III. Americans are symbolic conservatives and operational liberals

Democrats and Republicans characteristically regard political choices differently.

In surveys dating back to 1981, when Americans respond to surveys regarding specific issues, a majority – often even a majority of Republicans – favor liberal social policies (which represent the Democratic agenda). Social Security and Medicare, environmental and consumer protections, funding for education, transportation, and even welfare have ample popular support. A majority of Americans are, in the language of political scientists, “operational liberals.”

But don’t tell that to American voters. They may (whether they’ve reflected on it or not) like liberal programs, but when asked to describe their political views, more Americans identify as conservatives, than as liberals. (Gallup, in January 2019, put the number of liberals at 26%, while 35% of Americans regarded themselves as conservative.) Further, when waxing philosophical, Americans lean right, expressing a preference for a smaller, less powerful government that provides less “free stuff” (in Mitt Romney’s words, reflecting the Republican point of view). In the idiom of social science, this conservative predisposition makes Americans “symbolic conservatives.”

Recognizing this disparity, the parties play to their strengths in political campaigns and policy debates.

Candidates battling for the nomination of either party face an obvious strategic incentive to adopt the most effective means of stimulating popular appeal among their fellow partisans, which might be expected to carry over into elevated enthusiasm within the loyal party base once a successful nominee turns to face the opposition in the fall campaign. But the tendency of Democrats to emphasize policy specifics and group benefits and the corresponding Republican penchant for stressing more abstract ideological themes are both further reinforced by the broader American public’s simultaneous preference for operational liberalism and symbolic conservatism.  Democratic and Republican candidates compete for the support of persuadable voters in general elections by battling to establish their preferred frame of partisan conflict: Democrats gain an advantage by portraying the differences between the candidates as primarily defined by distinct policy positions, while Republicans benefit when voters instead view their electoral options as representing a choice between contrasting philosophical commitments.

IV. Overlooking the truth and the facts is deeply embedded in the Republican Party

The foundational differences between the parties (as described in Part II) and the differences in the way the two parties communicate their messages (as described in Part III) provides an explanation for why Republicans engage in overlooking the truth and overlooking facts, in contrast to the approach of Democrats. To see why this is so, let’s explore the implications of these contrasts – beginning with the Democrats.

Democrats in office, responsive to members of their coalition, “are rewarded for delivering concrete benefits to targeted groups in order to address specific social problems.” Democrats are intent on doing something tangible – crafting, enacting, and implementing public policies – to benefit their constituents. Practical results matter.

A moment’s reflection shows why this pragmatic imperative precludes Democratic indifference to, or dodging of, facts and evidence. Crafting legislation and rulemaking, for instance, are unlikely to turn out well unless Democrats have their facts straight. Without a solid understanding of the social problem, disadvantage, or injustice they seek to remedy or mitigate, Democrats would be hard pressed to know how to proceed. Research, policy expertise, and real-world feedback are essential to creating programs that benefit constituents.

Results-oriented Democrats have a stake in making things work – even if they must compromise or proceed incrementally to move nearer to the goal. Half a loaf is better than none. Democrats aim to offer help through public policy initiatives. This enterprise is thoroughly fact-based because that maximizes the prospects of success. And failure is unlikely to yield votes.

Republicans, on the other hand, risk defeat if they are perceived as straying from what counts as conservative doctrine. “Republican voters and activists are more likely than their Democratic counterparts to prize symbolic demonstrations of ideological purity and to pressure their party leaders to reject moderation and compromise.”

Standing up for conservative values is paramount. Moreover, conservative ideology affirms both a belief in limited government and skepticism, even hostility, toward fixing social problems through government initiatives. Add to this an aversion to helping the “takers” (Mitt Romney, again Paul Ryan) in the Democratic coalition.

When ideology is front and center, facts are beside the point. Republicans aren’t interested in facts about disadvantaged groups, or communities experiencing injustice, or public policy options to address social problems. Doing nothing – without taking facts into account – is the default position of conservative ideology.

Loyalty to conservatism demands resistance to government intervention. Any compromise – tacking this way or that way to get something done – is a failure to uphold principle. Half a loaf is half a loaf too much. Obstruction counts as success. The adage, ‘Don’t confuse me with the facts,’ is completely apropos here.

V. Democratic ACA and Republican Repeal and Replace

Consider, by way of illustrating the parties’ distinct stances regarding truth and facts, a major piece of Democratic legislation, the Affordable Care Act, and the Republican pledge to repeal and replace it.

When Barack Obama directed Congress to reform health care, after pledging to do so during his campaign, he knew there were Democrats in the House and the Senate who had spent decades studying the issue and who therefore: understood the real-world problems that accompany the way health care is delivered in the U.S.; were familiar with a range of proposed solutions, the costs and trade-offs, and the industry interests that would have to be accommodated; and had learned from Bill Clinton’s failed effort at reform early in his administration.

Health care policy is complicated, expensive, and affects everyone. Democrats were well-prepared to take up the challenge, beginning with a clear sense of the policy goals: to increase the number of Americans with health insurance, to make health care more affordable, and to enact consumer protections.

A Democratic Congress drew on academic research; the experience of doctors, hospitals, drug makers, insurers, and consumers, among others; policy expertise inside and outside of government; and lobbyists representing every sector with a stake in the issue. Congress held scores of hearings as it crafted the Affordable Healthcare Act and revised the law both to satisfy the policy goals and to secure majorities in both the House and the Senate for a bill that the President could sign.

ACA was signed into law in March 2010. It has for the most part worked as intended (even as both the Trump administration and many Republican-led states have done their best to sabotage it – efforts that are ongoing). The great majority of people with insurance from the exchanges are pleased with the law, as are others who have received tangible benefits as a result of the changes.

Passing and implementing the ACA would have been utterly impossible without an exacting command of the facts – and an unwillingness to permit wishful thinking, or ideological fervor, or irresistible campaign talking points to trump the empirically grounded details that guided the effort.

Compare that success to the Republican failure to undo the ACA, aka, Obamacare. Republicans campaigned in 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016 on the promise to repeal and replace Obamacare (with something better and cheaper), but after winning the White House and both houses of Congress in 2016, they proved incapable of doing so.

Why? Republicans don’t have a very deep public policy bench in Congress. GOP Congressional leaders have shown little interest in health care apart from opposition to Obamacare. The GOP didn’t conduct scores of hearings to clarify their understanding of the problems with the delivery of health care, or to assess and refine proposed solutions. Furthermore, previous GOP ideas – such as Heritage Foundation plans as early as 1989 – are no longer viable because the Republican Party has moved so far to right in the intervening years. That Heritage plan, like Mitt Romney’s reform in Massachusetts, is far too socialistic for the party now (though perhaps it was then, as well; it may have been a stalking horse).

The ideal health care policy of conservative true believers is probably the 1950s-era status quo in the United States (before the passage of Medicare). Although moderates and liberals have been purged from the party, that anachronistic vision is too draconian for many Republicans (or at least for their constituents). Tens of millions of people are insured because of Obamacare – in red states and blue. Subsidies are available. Pre-existing conditions are covered. Parents can insure their children up to age 26.

Campaigning against the individual mandate might have won votes, but coverage for preexisting conditions wouldn’t be possible without requiring everyone to have insurance. Republican voters get riled up over “socialism,” but most don’t want to see their representatives disrupt the post-Obamacare state of affairs. That might be a contradiction, but, as we know, many Republicans are operational liberals (and have benefited from the law).

So, here’s the box the GOP found itself in after November 2016: repealing unpopular provisions and regulations of ACA would eliminate the popular features. Millions of Americans appreciate the coverage the law provides; no one wants to lose benefits or to see deductibles and premiums rise. Republicans found themselves in a familiar place: opposed to government ‘overreach,’ but unable to eliminate a major social welfare program.

In the GOP, as described in Asymmetric Politics, general themes expressing traditional values (and attacks on liberalism and socialism) trump specific, concrete facts. We saw that in the case of repeatedly invoked pledges to repeal and replace. There was never, over seven years’ time, a viable plan to replace Obamacare with. There was no way to keep the popular provisions of the law, while throwing out what conservatives detested. There was hardly a plausible political route to repeal and replace. Yet Republicans repeatedly campaigned on that promise. What can we say about them? At the least: Republicans engaged in overlooking the truth and the facts when repeatedly invoking that pledge.

This is a well-worn pattern baked into the foundational fabric of the Republican Party. Facts don’t matter much when officeholders are guided by ideology (and raw partisan calculation).

V. Subsequent steps in the explanation

The next steps in the explanation of the distinctive Republican aversion to truth, facts, and trustworthy evidentiary standards begin with a look at the conservative media universe, which Grossmann and Hopkins analyze and document in Chapter 4 (“The Not-So-Great Debate”) of their book. As we approach 2020, as many observers have noted, Fox News has become a dominating force in the Republican Party; FNC not only informs (and misinforms), it motivates activists, increases Republican turnout, and punishes officeholders in the GOP; and, as Fox has gained strength, distortion and distraction have morphed into conspiracy theories and falsehoods in Republican messaging.

All topics to explore in future posts.

(Image: screen grab of video by Meg Kelly, “President Trump has made 15,413 false or misleading claims over 1,055 days,” December 16, 2019, Washington Post.)